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VIOLENT TRANSFORMATION PROCESSES AND  
THE QUESTION OF JUSTICE AND PEACE 
 
Doris Goedl 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This century has often been described as an Age of Extremes, as a 
time of violence and barbarism.  Political and social instability have 
characterized conflicts in all parts of the world.  Relative stability marked 
the period of 1945 until 1989.  After 1989, political and socioeconomic 
changes and upheavals started in the former socialist countries.  Some 
countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary transformed mostly in 
a peaceful way, whereas other countries like former Yugoslavia went 
through a period of war, genocide and man-made disaster.  In trying to 
understand the aftermath of violent disintegration in the former 
Yugoslavia, this paper will focus on the war in Bosnia.  In addition, I will 
stress the following points: 
1. The interplay between politics, law and justice in the case of 
former Yugoslavia;    
2. The interplay between international and domestic politics; and 
3. Trauma in the political context – the level of the victims 
 
1. The Ongoing War In Bosnia And The Establishing Of The 
International Criminal Tribunal For Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
 
After the declarations of independence in Slovenia and Croatia in 
1991 and 1992 respectively, and a vote for independence in Bosnia in 
March of 1992, the Serbian nationalism stepped up and became violent. 
This was evidenced by the shelling of Dubrovnik and the sack of Vukovar, 
the first major crimes of these wars, followed by the onslaught of Bosnian 
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Muslims and Croats.1  “Ethnic cleansing” was declared instrumental in 
giving the state territorial definition, and mass-killings, terror, rapes and 
other atrocities accompanied this policy.  It was designed to render the 
territory ethnically pure and ensure a hatred and fear that would endure 
between Muslims and Serbs.  As a result, these communities could never 
again live together.  Huge peace demonstrations were held in Sarajevo, but 
when a sniper killed a Muslim girl, it became clear to nearly everybody 
that there would be no peaceful reconciliation.  On the contrary, as a 
Bosnian Franciscan stated,  
Then the sniper killed a Muslim girl of seven or eight years.  
She was with her mother, on her hand and he saw that she 
is a Muslim girl.  He could have killed me, thousands of 
other people who were there, but he killed this Muslim girl.  
At this point I saw that Milosevic and his people need the 
war.  The non violent situation in Sarajevo became in this 
moment an armed fight.2  
 
By the end of 1992, Serb forces controlled approximately 70 
percent of Bosnian territory, nearly 2 million Bosnians had lost their 
homes; 1.1 million refugees were dispersed to different countries. The rest 
of the Bosnians were forced to the three enclaves: Srebenica, Žepa and 
Goradže, where the Muslim population held a majority.  At the same time, 
Lawrence Eagleburger, Bush’s secretary of state and former Ambassador 
to Yugoslavia stated that there was a “moral and historical obligation not 
to stand back a second time in this century while a people faces 
obliteration.”  In doing so, he called for charges against Milošević, 
                                                          
1 See GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE:  THE POLITICS OF WAR 
CRIMES TRIBUNALS 210 (2000) (citing CAB 23 / 43, Imperial War Cabinet 39, 28 
November 1918, 11:45 a.m., at 2-5). 
2 Interviews were conducted with fifty men and women in the former Yugoslavia as part 
of an Austrian research project. 
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Karadžić and Bosnian Serb Army chief Ratko Mladić for “crimes against 
humanity.”3  
In January 1993, there was already an interim report for the 
Security Council, describing ethnic cleansing, mass murder, rape and other 
atrocities.  This interim report and a proposal by UN Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali led to an international tribunal in May 1993 to 
examine war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, known as the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), based in The Hague.4  In 
September of that year, eleven judges were appointed through the General 
Assembly of the UN and in July 1994, Richard Goldstone was appointed 
as the first chief prosecutor.  The expectations of the International 
Community concerning the tribunal were serious but low.  “I would not 
measure the tribunal in terms of how many people go to jail, or top-level 
people, because the number is going to be very low. Success is a 
commitment to establish principles of accountability, getting out the 
truth,” was the strong statement made by John Shattuck, assistant secretary 
of state for Human Rights.5  Nevertheless, in February 1995, Richard 
Goldstone indicted twenty-one Bosnian Serbs for running the Omarska 
concentration camp [comma omitted] and camp commander Zeljko 
Meakić was slapped with an indictment for genocide.  
Out of the twenty-one men indicted, only Tadic, a low-level 
official, was available for trial.  When his case was opened in 1996, a lot 
of indicted war criminals were still not transferred to The Hague, which 
was discussed as a political problem.  Because of a reluctant policy on the 
part of the UN and NATO to enforce its edicts, the tribunal could only 
inconvenience and stigmatize its suspects, and could only threaten the 
                                                          
3 See BASS, supra note 1, at 213. 
4  The ICTY eventually became known as “The Hague,” or “The Hague Tribunal.” 
5 See generally RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE, TO END A WAR (1999). 
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governments in Croatia and Serbia with a report of their noncompliance to 
the Security Council. Even after the “fall of Srebenica” in July 1995, there 
was not really a breakthrough for the ICTY, because the West did not wish 
to incur on one side during the preparations for the Dayton peace process 
by subjecting their “war heroes” to prosecution and indictment.6  At this 
point, Richard Goldstone was quite sure that the peace agreement in 
Dayton contain a commitment by the signatories to hand over to the 
Tribunal those accused of war crimes.  
The military response to Goldstone came immediately. On the 
same day, when The Hague Tribunal indicted the leader of the Bosnian 
Serbs, Radovan Karadžić, and his military commander Mladic, the latter 
was conquering Žepa, one of the declared UN “safe areas.”  After that 
event, NATO started with bombing of Bosnian Serb positions, which was 
at this time easier, because there were no UN Protection Forces 
(UNPROFOR) vulnerable to Serb hostage-taking.7  Hard pressed by 
NATO bombing and by huge and rapid victories of the Croatian and 
Bosnian army in northwestern Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs capitulated.  
Richard Holbrooke brokered a cease-fire for Sarajevo and the Dayton 
peace process came in his final phase.  Nevertheless, when the parties in 
Dayton reached an accord for the deployment of peacekeepers in Bosnia, 
the mandate for the International Force remained vague with respect to 
cooperation with The Hague.  Missions to track down wanted men were 
not foreseen either in the Dayton mandate or in the training provided to 
the troops. According to Jonathan Bass, the American public was assured 
                                                          
6 During the fights in Srebenica between the 11th and 14th of July, 1995 Bosnian Serb 
forces proceeded to slaughter at least seven thousand Muslims at Srebenica, the single 
worst crime against humanity in Europe since World War II. 
7  While conquering Srebenica, Mladic took 450 Dutch UNPROFOR troops hostage, 
using them as human shields against NATO air strikes. 
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by President Clinton that, “we’re not going to be rummaging around in the 
mountains looking for war criminals.”8     
When the Canadian Judge Louise Arbour succeed Richard 
Goldstone, the policy of the Tribunal changed. First, she instituted the 
practice of issuing sealed indictments, and secondly, she indicted 
Slobodan Milošević for crimes against humanity in Kosovo.  “The 
evidence upon which this indictment was confirmed raises serious 
questions about their suitability to be the guarantors of any deal, let alone 
a peace agreement.“9  This was the opposite position of Richard Holbroke 
who gave the green light for his team to negotiate with Radovan Karadžić 
and Ratko Mladic during the Dayton peace process.  
2. The interplay between the ICTY and domestic political affairs 
Establishing The Hague Tribunal was an important step to take 
from the International Community to react to war crimes and genocide in 
the former Yugoslavia.  The next step, and I think this is a most difficult 
step, had to deal with the interplay between the demands of international 
judiciary and domestic policy.  The interplay between international and 
domestic law concerning truth and reconciliation is a very complicated 
matter, especially when dealing with the political reactions in the different 
states.  Even when the democratic governments which replaced the former 
authoritarian regimes in Croatia and Serbia (2000) made efforts to reform 
their judicial system, we had to face limited public support for war crimes 
prosecutions, especially against members of the ethnic majority.  Human 
Right Watch reported that police assistance to war crime prosecutors and 
investigate judges remain half-hearted; in some cases police officers were 
themselves implicated in the commission of war crimes.  Therefore, 
                                                          
8 See BASS, supra note 1, at 239 (quoting Dick Morris, a former pollster and strategist for 
President Clinton). 
9 Id. at 274.  
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effective and fair prosecutions are possible only if governments are 
seriously willing to commit themselves to create the conditions necessary 
for crimes accountability.  
In recent years, government support for domestic prosecutions of 
members of the ethnic majority has gradually increased in Bosnia-
Herzegowina and Croatia. Government officials in Serbia and Republika 
Srpska have either opposed10 or grudgingly supported the work of the 
Hague Tribunal.  Official policy in Serbia states the support of domestic 
prosecutions, but without the intention to arrest fugitives. Instead, the 
authorities try to convince them to surrender voluntarily, as Carla del 
Ponto stated.11  The hollowness of their support is evidenced by the fact 
that there have been few domestic trials in Serbia, and virtually none in 
Republika Srpska.  “[I]t remains the case that, nine years after Dayton, the 
authorities of Republika Srpska have not apprehended a single individual 
indicted by the ICTY.”12   
In 2002, The Hague Tribunal announced their intention to refer all 
cases - not involving the main political and military figures from the 
Yugoslav wars - to the national courts in the region, with the exception of 
Serbia.13  
                                                          
10 See, e.g., Documentation Centre of Republic of SRPSKA & Bureau of Government of 
RS for Relation with ICTY, Report about Case Srebrenica, at http://www.slobodan-
milosevic.org/documents/srebrenica.pdf (Sep. 2002). – October 16, 2004 you can find a 
file about the “Forbidden Srebrenica Report” where the Republika Srpska Bureau for 
Cooperation with the ICTY exposed the official Srebenica report as a fraud. 
11 Press Release, Address by Carla Del Ponte, prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, to the United Nations Security Council (Nov. 23, 
2004) (CDP/P.I.S/917-e), available at http://www.un.org/icty/latest/index.htm. (last 
visited Feb. 2005).  
12 Id. 
13 See Human Rights Watch, Justice at Risk: War Crimes Trials in Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/icty1004/3.htm (In fall 2004 the request for two 
referrals to Croatia, and motion to referrals to Bosnia-Herzegowina were made by the 
ICTY. But there is no indication that any cases will be transferred from the ICTY to the 
Serbian judiciary.). 
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There is a legitimate concern that a country like Serbia, 
which is not willing to arrest indictees, will not either be 
interested in, or capable of, trying alleged war criminals 
domestically. The networks supporting persons accused of 
war crimes are so powerful there, that they can interfere 
with the juidical proceedings, including by intimidating 
witnesses (...), or even by threatening the stability of the 
country. Both in Serbia proper and in Kosovo, aggressive 
nationalist rhetoric are being used in smear campaigns 
against the Tribunal and its Prosecutor.14  
 
This comprehensive statement of the Chief Prosecutor refers to another 
problem of the ICTY- the ethnic bias of the tribunal. Based on trial 
monitoring, Human Right Watch has concluded that bias by the judiciary 
has influenced trials in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegowina, and Serbia. Looking 
to Serbia it became clear what it meant.  In the past three years only Serb 
defendants had been prosecuted by Serb judges and prosecutors.  The only 
cases in Republika Srpska involve defendants of Serb ethnicity.  Beside 
ethnic bias on the part of judges and prosecutors, the key obstacles for fair 
and effective trials include poor case preparation by prosecutors, 
inadequate cooperation from the police in the conduct of investigations, 
poor cooperation between the states on judicial matters, and ineffective 
witness protection mechanisms.15   
At the end of this chapter Carla del Ponte tried to find an answer 
for the question about the achievements of the ICTY since his 
implementation.  “Although significant progress was achieved…, it has to 
be stressed that a number of obstacles which are outside of the Tribunal’s 
                                                          
14 Press Release, supra note 11. 
15 See Human Rights Watch, Justice at Risk: War Crimes Trials in Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/icty1004/5.htm#_Toc84316123 (According to Human 
Rights Watch these obstacles were found in Croatia as well as in Bosnia-Herzegowina 
and Serbia). 
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control may still derail the completion strategy.”16  She addresses two 
important obstacles to achieve completion:  the lack of co-operation of the 
states in arresting and transferring of persons indicted to The Hague, and 
the failure to find important key indictees, like Radovan Karadžić, Ratko 
Mladic and Ante Gotovina.  Before these men are not arrested and referred 
to The Hague, the work of the ICTY would not be completed.  Therefore, 
del Ponte urged the governments of Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia-
Herzegowina to overtake their responsibility in bringing these fugitives to 
The Hague.  
3. Between Venegance and Forgiveness: Trauma in the Political 
Context 
  
Dealing with the political level of law and judiciary in post-war 
societies, the question had to be asked: Must all societies pursue 
prosecutions in order to comply with international human rights 
standards?  We can find different responses to this question.  For example, 
East Germany’s extension of public access to secret police files after 1989, 
or Czech’s screening and removal of officials and civil servants involved 
in the old regime from public office.  These are less aggressive responses 
than prosecution, but they satisfy people’s needs to know what happened. 
Even though the successor states of former Yugoslavia didn’t brought 
these issues to their national political agenda, and even though there were 
consideration that foreign-imposed trials may cause a nationalist backlash, 
it became clear that “international tribunals are better than the usual 
alternative, which is simple venegance by aggrieved parties.  It is not that 
these complicated and often muddled trials are too noble to question; it is 
that the other options would be worse.”17  As first results from my field 
                                                          
16 Press Release, supra note 11. 
17 See BASS, supra note 1, at 285. 
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research show, the wish for truth and justice is – at least in the female 
interviewees - stronger than the longing for venegance or revenge, which I 
want to demonstrate with the following narratives from Croatia and 
Bosnia.18 
“I’m still an expelled person with no rights.” - Female from Srebenica 
 
In May 1993, troops of Arkan and Seselj 
(paramilitary troops of the Bosnien Serbian Army) entered 
Srebencia.  First, they looted our houses, and then they 
burned them. We hided [sic.] ourselves in the forests 
around the city, but after the “big burning,” we came back. 
It was better to be in the city, although everything was 
nearly destroyed.  Life was difficult in these days.  The 
bombing and shelling went on, a lot of refugees (approx. 
60.000) from other cities were in the town and we hadn’t 
enough to eat.  The international aid didn’t really reached 
[sic] us at this time.  But then we started to organize 
ourselves and the humanitarian aid from the International 
Community was slowly provided.  In summer 1993 
Srebenica was declared as an UN-safe area.  We thought 
that the nightmare will be over; that the world is with us 
and that there will be no more killing, bombing and so on 
and so forth.  This more or less peaceful situation lasted 
until summer 1995. By then the Bosnian Serbs started again 
with heavy bombing, even though we were declared as an 
UN protected zone.  But the UN troops withdrew from 
Srebencia to the UN-base Potocari and we were asked to 
move with them.  
On July 11th the evacuation of Srebenica started. 
There were buses waiting which should bring us to the UN-
base; the first seperation started, when young men didn’t 
board the buses but went instead to the forests.  My son 
was one of them and this was the last time I saw him.  The 
situation was totally chaotic, granates came from 
everywhere; there were shootings; some people were in 
buses, some tried to escape; dead and wounded people; 
children crying and so on and so forth.  
                                                          
18 During my field research about the violent disintegration of former Yugoslavia, 50 
interviews with men and women were conducted.  
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I came with the rest of my family to the UN-base 
Potocari which was already crowded with some 30.000 
people from Srebenica.  The whole night the base was 
granated and on the next day the Serbian Army, the troops 
of General Mladic, came and started to seperate men and 
women.  They took away my brother and in the following 
night we could hear screaming and shouting.  It was 
horrible. The next day it became clear what had happened. 
They had slaughtered the men and raped the women; 570 
women never came back.  
The following day the military started with the 
deportations. Whereas the women, small children and 
elderly people were forced to enter the already waiting 
buses, the men and juvenile children were not allowed to 
board the buses.  They took my husband to the side and this 
was the last time I saw him.  I had to enter one of the 
waiting bus, but I was shocked and paralysed with fear.  
The bus driver said that he couldn’t help us and he had to 
bring us to Tuzla.  On the way we saw killings, dead 
bodies, and again and again some militaries stopped our 
buses and took out young women, who never came back.  
Finally we arrived in Tuzla and months went by.  I 
was searching for my son, my husband and other family 
members.  Whereas my son was never found, I could 
identify my husband in the year 2000, when they lifted a 
mass-grave in Zvornik.  He is now buried in Potocari, 
which became a memorial site for the victims of Srebnica. 
I’m still an expelled person with no rights. In the Republica 
Srpska I don’t have the same rights like the Serbian 
population and in the Croatian-Muslim Federation I don’t 
have rights, because I’m not a citizen of the federation.  To 
seek justice I’m working in the organisation of the 
“Mothers of the enclave Srebenica and Zepa” which is an 
NGO and does – beside other things - a lot of work on the 
disappeared (to register, to identity, to bury them) and try to 
help their families.    
 
“I seek justice towards a single person.“ - Female from Sarajevo 
My father was killed near the mosque that means 
somebody selected him because he was a Muslim.  As far 
as we know now, it would be possible to trace back this 
killing.  Yes, I wanted them to be punished.  If I could 
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figure out who killed my father I would seek for justice and 
the indictment of this person.  But otherwise I don’t have 
anything against the people (refering to the Bosnian Serbs) 
because that would be irrational.  You can hate a concrete 
person, but not the whole nation.  Therefore I would seek 
justice towards a single person and on this point I would 
give no quarter.          
 
“This is my duty as medical doctor. ” - Female from Baranja    
At the end of the war I was working in the 
ambulance of the Hospital in Baranja (East-Croatia).  An 
old man was brought for treatment and he asked me if I 
would know where he is.  I denied, but when he mentioned 
the name of his wife I started to recognize him. He was in 
jail because during the war he and his wife (both Serbs) had 
killed sixteen Croats in a very perfidious way.  They 
searched the birth register, figured out the Croats and went 
to visit them for coffee, and then they killed them. I asked 
him for the reasons and he answered, “I did it for my 
people.”  Then he asked me if I [sic] still give him medical 
treatment. To be honest, for a second, I thought I could kill 
him and nobody would know.  But then I said, yes of 
course.  This is my duty as a medical doctor.  He was taken 
by the UNPROFOR and is now in a jail in Serbia to wait 
for his trial. 
 
“I didn’t want to hate a whole nation.” - Female from Banja Luka 
When the Bosnian Serbs took over Banja Luka the 
police raided and looted flats and houses of the Muslim 
population.  First the police came to the house of my 
grandparents and expelled them with force.  They were old, 
stayed their whole life in this house and had nowhere to go. 
Afterwards the same happened to my parents. I was the last 
in the row.  When they came to my flat, the police officer 
took his gun on my head and forced me out of my flat. 
Later I lost my job too.  But I didn’t leave the city because 
this is what they wanted us to do, to become an “ethnical 
[sic] cleaned” city.  
After the war I saw this police officer in a coffee 
shop and my first reaction was revenge.  But then I 
realized, if I would react in this way the process of 
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forgiving could never begin.  And I didn’t want to spent the 
rest of my life hating a whole nation. I ordered a coffee for 
this police officer and he came to my table to ask who I’m. 
I told him the story and he started to recognize me and I 
said, “I could look in your eyes before and I could do the 
same now.”  He lowered his eyes and asked me to forgive 
him.  What I did!  Since this time peace had became real 
for me. 
 
All these narratives show that these women had to face a living 
after war, totalitarian terror, genocide or other mass atrocities.  Armed 
conflicts often mean loss of livelihood, abuse and rape.  When people are 
forced for political reasons like terror and war to undergo traumatic events 
such as rape and violence, these occur in especially aversive conditions.  
In many cases there are no preparations and these circumstances are 
experienced as catastrophic or traumatic, often connected with feelings of 
overpowering helplessness.  In the case of Bosnia, many men and women 
survivors made their traumatic experience (destruction of their homes, 
forced expelling, rape) by people who had previously been neighbors.   
The emotional consequences of the disruption of social bonds goes 
along with a loss of confidence and trust in other people, as a kind of 
destruction of personal and social connectedness.  In this context, the 
experiences of war and terror could be seen as central assault on the 
dignity of men and women, leading to a loss of confidence in the world.  
Backed with these psychological aspects,19 these narratives show the 
importance of justice on a personal level. Beside international efforts of 
dealing with war crimes, these women want to give testimony, to try to 
face their perpetrators, and to seek for justice on an individual level, and 
then they can start to forgive.  
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These narratives show also very clearly that there are different 
levels of truth and reconciliation:  the ICTY as huge international 
framework (like the narrative from Sarajevo), the domestic level of 
judiciary (like the narrative from Baranja and Sarajevo) and the efforts on 
the level of the individuals.  Only the latter can forgive, because 
forgiveness is something between human beings and needs the facing of 
victim and perpetrator (like the narrative from Banja Luka).  Furthermore, 
these narratives show not only the connection between justice and peace, 
they also break with the prejudice of the ”ancient hatred” in the balkans.  
If truth is based on justice (on the elaborated interplay between the 
different levels), if there is a process of public acknowledging of what had 
happened, truth and reconciliation can be more than rhetoric.    
Let me conclude these considerations with the following short 
statement.  I think the political efforts inventing the ICTY were important 
steps towards justice and peace.  Although there is some criticism, I agree 
with Jonathan Bass who wrote that this kind of legalism will never make 
up for the lives lost, but legalism is all we have now.20  It doesn’t make up 
fo the losses, but the invention of international and national law and 
justice is an important level for recovering from individual experienced 
trauma. “Justice is essential to strengthen the rule of law, soften the 
bitterness of victim’s families, and remove an obstacle to cooperation 
among the parties.”21  With this approach the interplay between political 
circumstances and individual violent experiences are put into the focus of 
attention and became crucial for truth and reconciliation processes.  In 
working with victims of political violence, you can make the clients 
                                                                                                                                                
19 At this point I don’t discuss the impact of unresolved history for truth and reconiliation, 
but I want to stress the importance of dealing with the past for reconciliation in post-war 
societies.  
20 See GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE:  THE POLITICS OF WAR 
CRIMES TRIBUNALS (2000). 
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understand that the traumatic event wasn’t a personal failure, but it had to 
do with the violated political circumstances.  Therefore it is necessary that 
politics take responsibility for what had happened, even if they deny their 
responsibility, or hide or escape.  Inventing trials like the Hague Tribunal 
for accusing the misleading of political power (like torture, rape and mass-
killings) and for naming the perpetrators is an important first step towards 
truth and justice.  This is even more important as the truth about war 
crimes is suppressed and neglected.       
4. Epilogue 
Hannah Arendt is right when she stated that we are unable to 
forgive what we cannot punish and we are unable to punish what has 
turned out to be unforgivable, and it would be wrong to do nothing.  
Beside the powerful realist criticism of war crimes trials, that such efforts 
will perpetuate a war, or destabilize postwar efforts to build a secure 
pease, I will state – out of my long time experiences in former Yugoslavia 
- that this kind of legalism will never make up for the lives lost, but 
legalism is all we have now.  Or to say it with Madeleine Albright,  
Justice is essential to strengthen the rule of law, so often the 
bitterness of victim’s families, and remove an obstacle to 
cooperation among the parties.  It will help ensure that our 
forces can depart Bosnia without the fear that renewed 
violence threatening U.S. interests might one day return. It 
will establish a model for resolving ethnic differences by 
the force of law rather than the law of force.22  
 
If we believe that peace in post-war societies has different layers 
(like economic stability, some kind of prosperity and perspectives for the 
                                                                                                                                                
21 Albright Madeleine, Address at the Hague Tribunal (1997). 
22 Albright Madeleine, Address at the Hague Tribunal (1997). 
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future), justice had to be seen as “a parent to peace.”23  Therefore I would 
like to see the Hague Tribunal as a parent to peace in former Yugoslavia, 
because the treatment of the past through international and national law, as 
well as through remembering and forgetting shapes not only the present, 
but also the future of entire post-war societies.  Trying to come to terms 
with truth and reconciliation, a narrow route between too much memory 
and too much forgetting had to be taken. “Nations like individuals need to 
face up to and understand traumatic past events before they can put them 
aside and move on to normal life.”24 Whereas nations had to deal with 
their past on a collective level, victims and their families have a moral 
right to know and to gain right-security and justice on an individual level. 
The interplay between both can eventually lead to peace and 
reconciliation, but it will take time.   
 
                                                          
23 Albright Madeleine, Address at the Hague Tribunal (1999). 
24 MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER 
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 118 (1998) (quoting Tina Rosenberg).   
